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Article 6

Grappling with the Meaning of
“Testimonial”
Richard D. Friedman †
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crawford v. Washington 1 has adopted a testimonial
approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be
testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an
accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the
person who made the statement and that person is unavailable
to testify at trial. If a statement is not deemed to be
testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any
obstacle to its admission. 2 A great deal therefore now rides on
the meaning of the word “testimonial.”

†

Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School;
rdfrdman@umich.edu. I comment further on questions related to the topic of this
paper on The Confrontation Blog, www.confrontationright.blogspot.com. I have filed a
petition for certiorari in Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705), one of the cases discussed in this article.
Though my views on the confrontation right continue to evolve, I do not believe I have
been led to any of the views expressed in this article by the fact of this representation.
A draft of the article completed long before I undertook the Hammon representation is
available on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (Feb. 16,
2005, 17:18 EST).
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law – as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”). As far as I am aware, only one postCrawford decision has held, with respect to a statement that was not excluded by the
governing hearsay rules, that the statement was not testimonial and yet was barred by
the Confrontation Clause – and there the trial court’s error in admitting the statement
was deemed harmless. State v. Lawson, No. COA04-564, 2005 WL 2276520, at *3-5
(N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2005). In Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 738, 748 (Okla. Crim. App.
2004), the court also found a statement to be non-testimonial yet violative of the
Confrontation Clause, but it appears that the Miller court reached the confrontation
issue without deciding whether the rule against hearsay would require exclusion.
Moreover, at least arguably, the courts in both of these cases applied unduly narrow
views of the meaning of “testimonial.” My thanks to Andrew Fine for alerting me to
both cases.
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Those of us who previously advocated the testimonial
approach thus find ourselves in a position somewhat like that
of an opposition politician who suddenly wins election and has
to deal with the realities of government. It is relatively easy to
carp from the outside about what is wrong with the old regime,
to present an alternative approach in general terms, and to
offer a few illustrations of how that approach may work in real
situations. Actually resolving the daily flood of issues as they
arise may be considerably more difficult. Before Crawford, the
prevailing doctrine was the unsatisfactory rule of Ohio v.
Roberts, 3 under which the key question for confrontation
purposes was whether the statement should be deemed
sufficiently reliable to warrant admissibility. 4 In that context,
it was possible to advocate a wholesale doctrinal
transformation and adoption of a testimonial approach without
going into too much detail as to what “testimonial” means. But
now that Crawford has adopted the testimonial approach,
actual cases must be decided under it, and many of them.
Pretty quickly, we are going to have to get to a much fuller
understanding of the meaning of “testimonial.” 5
Of course, the analogy cannot be pushed too far.
Crawford, unlike many elections, did not put anybody in power
who was not already. Academics, commenting from the
sidelines, have neither the opportunity nor the responsibility to
decide cases. But I believe the transformation achieved by
Crawford was correct, and I want it to succeed. I am therefore
happy to take this opportunity to reflect at some length on the
question of what statements should be deemed testimonial for
Confrontation Clause purposes. I cannot offer in this article a
resolution for every possible situation posing an issue of
whether a statement should be deemed testimonial. Rather, I
hope to present a broad conceptual approach to the meaning of
“testimonial” and an overview of how several critical issues in
construing the term should be resolved.
3

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 66.
5
Chief Justice Rehnquist said as much in his separate opinion in Crawford,
541 U.S. at 75 (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of
state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the
Court lists . . . is covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months or years
from now.”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Prompt answers would, of course, be useful
to judges, defense lawyers, defendants, and other participants in the criminal justice
system – including the police officers who conduct initial interviews – as well as
prosecutors.
4
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Many of my arguments stem from one central insight,
which can be summarized this way:
Many courts and
commentators have attempted to define testimonial by starting
at a core of statements that includes trial testimony and then
working outwards. But this is a bad approach because the
whole point of the confrontation right is to bring testimony to
trial, or some other formal proceeding.
Parts II and III of this article develop this thought. In
Part II, I contend that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
is to assure that prosecution testimony be given under
prescribed conditions, most notably that it be in the presence of
the accused and subject to cross-examination.
Part III
examines the tendency of some courts, in determining whether
a statement is testimonial for purposes of the Clause, to ask
whether the statement bears a set of characteristics resembling
trial testimony. Rather, I argue, the courts should ask whether
the statement fulfills the function of prosecution testimony.
That function, in rough terms, is the transmittal of information
for use in prosecution.
Parts IV through VI address the question of the
perspective that should be used in determining whether a
statement is testimonial. Part IV argues that the critical
question is not the purpose for which the statement was given
or taken. Rather, the basic question is one of reasonable
anticipation at the time the statement was made – whether at
that time it appeared reasonably probable that the statement
would be used in prosecuting or investigating crime. As
discussed in Part V, it is a matter of secondary, though still
substantial, importance whether the test is objective or
subjective – that is, whether it depends on the actual
expectation of the given actor or on the expectation of a
reasonable person in the position of that actor. Part VI argues
that whether a statement is testimonial must be determined
from the perspective of the person who made it – the witness.
Parts VII, VIII, and IX examine several considerations
that may support the conclusion that a statement is
testimonial, but the absence of any one or more of which does
not mean that a statement is not testimonial. Thus, a
statement can be testimonial even if it is (a) not made to a
government agent; (b) made at the initiative of the witness,
rather than in response to interrogation; or (c) made in an
informal setting. Part X argues that a statement may be
testimonial even if it is made in great excitement shortly after
the event in question. Lastly, I discuss the difficult problem of
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child declarants in Part XI. Some very young children should
perhaps be considered too undeveloped to be capable of being
witnesses. In the case of children who are capable of being
witnesses, how to determine whether the given statement is
testimonial may often depend on whether a subjective or
objective approach is used.
At the outset, it may be useful to comment on the
intellectual orientation of this article. My aim is to develop a
conception of the Confrontation Clause that is theoretically
sound, that can be implemented practically, and that leads to
sensible results that are defensible and, at least for the most
part, intuitively appealing. I try to get to that point from both
ends, theoretical and practical. To some extent I support
particular doctrinal approaches by arguing that as a matter of
principle they are superior, and to some extent I do so by
showing how they lead to satisfactory results. Both aspects, I
believe, are essential. An argument from principle alone might
be radically indeterminate and could prove to be most
unsatisfactory when set in the crucible of actual cases. 6 An
argument based only on results would lack any connecting
thesis and so would hardly have any predictive or persuasive
power.
II.

THE CONDITIONS OF TESTIMONY

If a system of adjudication is to depend in large part on
the testimony of witnesses – which any rational system
ultimately does – then almost by definition it must determine
the conditions under which testimony may be given. That is,
an adjudicative system would hardly warrant that designation
if it provided:
Anybody who wishes to testify against a criminal defendant may do
so however she wishes. She may, for example, do so in open court,
but if she does not wish to testify in that way she may make a
statement to the police, or submit a written statement or a videotape
directly to the court, or she may make a statement to a friend with
the understanding that the friend will relay it to court.

One can imagine, because it has happened, different
rules for giving testimony. For example, many systems, but
6
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. Aug. 11, 2005), discussed
at The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (Aug. 18, 2005 09:29
EST) (purporting to apply a broad definition of the term testimonial, but yielding a
very narrow conception).
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not all, have insisted that testimony be given under oath. 7 A
system might provide, as the later Athenians did, that
testimony be written and placed into a sealed container, thus
allowing the parties to know before trial what the body of
evidence would be. 8 Or it might provide, as many Continental
courts have done, that testimony must be recorded out of the
presence of the parties, to prevent intimidation. 9 The English
took another course, one that the Hebrews, 10 the earlier
Athenians, 11 and the Romans 12 had followed: They insisted that
witnesses give their testimony “face to face” with the adverse
party. This practice was not universally followed, especially in
politically charged cases, but by the middle of the seventeenth
century it was firmly established even in that context. By then
it was also clear that the defendant could question the witness.
And even before then, and for long after, English commentators
proudly proclaimed this method of giving testimony as one of
the chief superiorities of the English system of criminal justice
over its Continental counterparts. 13 The practice took on even
greater significance in America, where the importance of
defense counsel and cross-examination became established
sooner. Shortly after declaring independence, the American
states made the practice a right protected by their
constitutions, and in 1791, in the Sixth Amendment, so did the
United States. 14

7

See, e.g., Helen Silving, The Oath, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959) (discussing the
history of the oath in various judicial systems).
8
STEPHEN TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 128-29 (1993); 2
DEMOSTHENES, PRIVATE ORATIONS 46:6, at 247-49 (A.T. Murray trans. 1939). (“The
laws . . . ordain that [a witness’s] testimony must be committed to writing in order that
it may not be possible to subtract anything from what is written, or to add anything to
it.”).
9
Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1171, 1202-03 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In].
10
Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15-18; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1022-23 & n.64 (1998) [hereinafter
Friedman, Search].
11
Stephen Todd, The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts, in NOMOS:
ESSAYS IN ATHENIAN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 19, 29 (Paul Cartledge et al. eds.,
1990).
12
Acts 25:16 quotes the Roman governor Festus as declaring: “It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his
accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the
charges.” See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988).
13
See Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1023-24 n.69.
14
See Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1206-07; Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 112-16 (1995) (arguing that before the Sixth Amendment, several
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Several points from this brief historical review bear
emphasis. First, the inquiry under the Confrontation Clause is
not best conceived in the terms that some writers (including
myself) have used, as a determination of what hearsay – some,
but less than all – should be excluded as a matter of
constitutional law. The right articulated by the Confrontation
Clause predated the development of the hearsay rule, and it
has existed in adjudicative systems that do not have a rule
resembling our rule against hearsay. The confrontation right
is really a fundamental rule of procedure, providing that if a
person acts as a witness against an accused then the accused
has a right to confront her. To act as a witness means to
testify, or to make a testimonial statement; although the
English words “witness” and “testimony” do not resemble each
other, their counterparts in many other languages come from
the same root and show the near identity between the two. 15
Thus, to make the question of whether a statement is
testimonial, the key criterion in applying the Confrontation
Clause is not merely a matter of choosing a convenient term
that will help distinguish between categories of hearsay. If a
statement is testimonial, then the maker has acted as a
witness, and so the statement is within the purview of the
Confrontation Clause. If the statement is not testimonial,
there may nevertheless be good reasons to exclude it – the lack
of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant may be a
significant factor weighing in favor of exclusion – but the
statement is simply not within the scope of the Confrontation
Clause.
Second, the Confrontation Clause is a guarantee rather
than merely a prohibition. Crawford said that “the principal
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” 16 That
is correct in the sense that the civil-law method was the one
most salient to the Framers: It had been used in some English
and American courts and the Framers and their forebears
found it highly objectionable. But certainly the Confrontation
states adopted provisions protecting the confrontation right, as well as other
procedural rights, as a result of the adversarial nature of American trials).
15
For example, a witness in French is un témoin, and testimony is
témoignage; in German, the words are zeuge and zeugnis. The French translation can
be found at Babel Fish Translation, http://babelfish.altavista.com/. The German
translation is available at LEO English/German Dictionary, http://dict.leo.org/.
16
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
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Clause did not mean to provide that any method of giving
testimony would be acceptable, so long as it did not resemble
the civil-law method. It did not mean, for example, to endorse
the later Athenian method of putting testimony in written form
in a pot that was kept sealed until trial; nor did it mean to
allow a witness to use a trusted confidante as a conduit for
passing her testimony on to court. Had the Confrontation
Clause been meant only to prohibit a given form of procedure,
it could have been written to do so; there are many such
clauses in the Constitution, 17 including in the Bill of Rights. 18
But the Confrontation Clause is an affirmative guarantee; it
ensures that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” 19 If a given
procedure for presenting the testimony of a witness does not
provide that right, it violates the Clause, no matter how
dissimilar that procedure may be to the civil-law method.
Thus, courts that, like State v. Davis, 20 treat a statement as
per se non-testimonial if it “cannot accurately be described as
an ex parte examination or its functional equivalent” 21 apply
too narrow a conception of what statements are testimonial.
Third, the view presented here means that the
conundrum that plagues originalist views of the Constitution in
other contexts – trying to determine what rule the Framers
prescribed for a situation that they could not anticipate – really
is not a problem with respect to the Confrontation Clause. No
matter how unfamiliar a given type of hearsay may have been
to the Framers, the originalist question posed by the Clause is
a simple one: Would admitting this statement against the
accused amount to allowing a witness to testify against him
without being subjected to confrontation? I do not mean to
advocate originalism as a dominant principle of constitutional
interpretation, but only to say that in this particular context it
works quite well. The passage of more than two centuries has
not substantially altered our insistence that prosecution
witnesses give testimony by one prescribed method – under

17

Note, for example, the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Note, for example, the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20
111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jul. 8, 2005)
(No. 05-5224).
21
Id. at 850.
18
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oath, face-to-face with the accused, and subject to crossexamination. 22
III.

A FUNCTIONAL RATHER THAN DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH

Part II has shown that there are many ways in which
prosecution testimony could be given, but that the
Confrontation Clause insists on one – face-to-face with the
accused and subject to cross-examination. It therefore makes
no sense to determine whether a statement is testimonial by
asking whether the statement shares key characteristics with
trial testimony. The very point of the Clause is to ensure that
testimony will be given at trial, or at some other proceeding
that maintains the essential attributes of trial testimony. To
say that a statement is beyond the reach of the Confrontation
Clause because the circumstances in which it was given do not
resemble a trial therefore turns logic on its head. It means
that the more that a statement fails to satisfy the conditions for
testimony prescribed by the Confrontation Clause, the less
likely the Clause will address the problem.
Thus, a characteristic-based approach to the question of
what is testimonial – that is, one that depends on whether the
statement has similar characteristics to trial testimony – lacks
logic and historical foundation. A critical practical factor also
weighs decisively against it. If certain characteristics are
deemed crucial for treating a statement as testimonial, then
repeat players involved in the creation or receipt of prosecution
evidence will have a strong incentive, and often ready means,
to escape that treatment, simply by avoiding those
characteristics. We have seen this already. Some courts have
indicated that even if a statement made knowingly to the police
accuses a person of a crime, it is not testimonial unless it is the
product of a formal interrogation conducted after the police
have determined that a crime has been committed. 23 Some
22

New technologies have presented the troubling issue of whether
confrontation requires that the witness and the accused always be in the same room
with each other. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990); Richard D.
Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 695 (2002) (commenting on
proposal to allow testimony from a remote location). But even to the extent the answer
is negative, the change created by sometimes allowing testimony from a remote
location is a relatively small alteration of the traditional procedure for presenting
testimony.
23
E.g., State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350, 355-56 (Ariz. 2005); State v. Hembertt,
696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 19, 2005) (No. 055981).
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courts have held that, so long as the police can be deemed to
have been assessing and securing the scene, even a statement
making an express criminal accusation is not testimonial. 24 As
a result, we have seen police advised to try to secure accusatory
statements before beginning what would necessarily be deemed
a formal interrogation. 25
These difficulties are all solved if, instead of relying on a
pre-determined checklist of characteristics, the determination
of whether a statement is testimonial depends on whether it
performs the function of testimony. That approach allows the
Confrontation Clause to perform its historically-supported
function, assuring that however testimony has been given it
will be proscribed unless it satisfies the demands of the Clause.
And it deprives repeat players of the ability or incentive to
manipulate because they cannot change the status of a
statement under the Clause by shaping the circumstances in
which the statement is given unless they defeat their own
purposes by depriving the statement of testimonial value.
This approach does, of course, require the articulation of
what the testimonial function is, and then implementation of
that standard. I will concentrate here on the first step. A
useful articulation, I believe, is that a statement is testimonial
if it transmits information for use in litigation. In the context
of importance to the Confrontation Clause, this usually means
that the statement transmits information for use in a criminal
prosecution. 26 (I am using “for” as a shorthand; as explained
24

E.g., Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d, at 483; Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444,
457-58 (Ind. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705); Spencer v.
State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
25
Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, VOICE (APRI’s Violence Against
Women Program, Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 8-9, available at http://www.ndaaapri.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_1_issue_1.pdf (proposing that police officers be asked
predicate questions at trial such as: “Were the statements taken during ‘the course of
an interrogation’?” “Were your questions to her an interrogation or merely part of your
initial investigation?”; “Were these questions asked in order to determine whether a
crime had even occurred?”).
26
This is not inevitable, though. At the argument of Crawford, Justice
Kennedy posed this interesting hypothetical: Criminal charges are brought arising
from a serious auto accident, and the prosecution offers a statement made shortly after
the accident by an observer to an insurance investigator. The statement could clearly
be characterized as testimonial with respect to civil litigation, whatever the
consequences of such a characterization might be. Should it be considered testimonial
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause? Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Crawford,
541 U.S. 36 (Nov. 10, 2003), 2003 WL 22705281 (No. 02-9410). I believe it should, even
without requiring proof that the declarant anticipated a criminal prosecution. In other
words, given that the declarant made the statement in anticipation of litigation, it
probably should be considered testimonial as a general matter, and therefore also for
Confrontation Clause purposes, even without a showing that the declarant anticipated
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below, I do not believe the statement needs to have been made
for the purpose of aiding a criminal prosecution to be deemed
testimonial.) 27
Note that “use in a . . . prosecution” is a somewhat
looser wording than, say, “use as evidence at trial” (which
resembles a wording I have used on at least one occasion 28).
Two reasons justify this choice. First, I think it is better as a
matter of principle. A great deal of criminal procedure occurs
before trial – the vast majority of cases never go to trial – and
evidence provided to the authorities can be useful to them and
help them secure a conviction long before trial. The trial is
when the confrontation right can most often be invoked – in
fact, this is a great deal of what makes a trial, given that the
confrontation most often occurs in the presence of the factfinder – but the information may have performed its
inculpatory function well beforehand. Indeed, it seems the
confrontation right should be independent of a right to trial.
Even if there were no proceeding recognizable as a trial – even
if all testimony were recorded and delivered piecemeal behind

use in prosecution. An alternative and plausible rule would require a demonstration
that the declarant anticipated prosecutorial use. In most cases, I suspect, such a
showing could be made: If the circumstances were serious enough to warrant
prosecution, and the declarant’s statement aided that prosecution, the declarant, or a
reasonable person in the position of the declarant, would probably have anticipated
that prosecution was a significant possibility.
27
Also, I will not explore beyond this footnote the question of what
prosecution will satisfy this definition. Does the defendant have to be identified at the
time of the statement? Not necessarily; it may be apparent when a statement is made
that it is likely to be useful to the prosecution, perhaps in proving that a crime has in
fact been committed, even though the perpetrator has not yet been identified. What if
the statement is made with one crime in mind and is later introduced at a trial for a
later-committed crime? If there is a substantial link between the two, that should
probably be enough; I have in mind the cases in which a statement is made in the
context of an incident of domestic violence, and the complainant is later murdered.
Forfeiture doctrine would often nullify the confrontation right in this context, though.
See, e.g., People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) review
granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004). Does any crime have to have been committed yet?
Not necessarily: here I have in mind the cases in which an eventual murder victim,
fearing her assailant, tells a confidante information to be used in the event that he
does in fact assault her and render her unable to testify. See State v. Cunningham, 99
P.3d 271, 274 (Or. 2004). Again, forfeiture is probable in this situation.
28
See Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1039 (asserting ambiguously that
if “the declarant correctly understands that her statement will be presented at trial”
the statement is testimonial, but that it is not testimonial if “the declarant correctly
understands at the time she makes the statement that it will play no role in any
litigation”). Cf. Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1240-41 (suggesting
as a workable standard: “If a statement is made in circumstances in which a
reasonable person would realize that it likely would be used in investigation or
prosecution of a crime, then the statement should be deemed testimonial.”).
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closed doors to a fact-finder – the accused should have a right
to confront the witnesses.
Second, this approach has the practical advantage of
helping us avoid a bothersome Catch-22.
Suppose the
governing doctrine makes admissibility at trial the critical
factor determining whether a statement is testimonial.
Suppose also that the jurisdiction assiduously protects the
confrontation right. This means that it will exclude testimonial
statements (unless the accused has had an opportunity to
cross-examine and the declarant is unavailable). But then a
statement that otherwise would be testimonial will not be
under the hypothetically governing law – for the very reason
that it is inadmissible at trial and so cannot be testimonial
under that law. But then if it is not testimonial it presumably
could be admitted . . . and so on. One could construct a
complicated contingent question to try to avoid this infinite
regress. It is far simpler, though, to avoid the whole problem
simply by speaking in terms of use of the information in
prosecution generally rather than specifically at trial.
IV.

ANTICIPATED USE

I have contended that, in rough terms, testimony is the
transmittal of information for use in prosecution. Necessarily,
then, the determination of whether a statement is testimonial
examines the situation as of the time the statement is made. A
standard that labeled a statement as testimonial because it
was actually used in prosecution would make no sense; it would
mean that any out-of-court statement offered by the
prosecution at trial to prove the truth of what it asserts – that
is, any hearsay – is testimonial.
To determine whether a statement is testimonial,
therefore, we must figuratively stand at the time of the
statement and look forward in time towards the prosecutorial
process. Now, let us assume for the sake of argument a point
that I will try to demonstrate in Part VI, that in doing so we
should take the perspective of the declarant, the purported
witness. And for the moment I will assume also that in taking
that perspective it is the actual state of mind of the witness –
rather than the state of mind of an hypothesized reasonable
person – that matters. The question I will address here is what
state of mind is necessary for the statement to be deemed
testimonial.
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It may be tempting to conclude, as some courts have
done, that the statement is testimonial only if it was made for
the purpose of transmitting information to be used in
prosecution. 29 But of course people often make statements for
multiple purposes, and so this test would immediately raise the
question of how important that purpose must be for the
statement to be deemed testimonial: The dominant purpose? A
purpose? Something in between, such as a decisive, but-for
purpose, absent which the statement would not have been
made? I think none of these should be the test. Instead, the
question is whether the declarant understood that there was a
significant probability that the statement would be used in
prosecution. In other words, the test is one of anticipation; one
might speak of it as an intent test, but only in the soft sense
that a person is deemed to have intended the natural
consequences of her actions.
I believe this anticipation test is preferable to a purpose
test for several reasons. First, as a matter of principle, it
better describes the testimonial function. Suppose, to put aside
for the moment several other issues, a witness gives a
statement to the police describing the commission of a crime in
circumstances like those of Crawford. If the statement is made
in the station house in response to formal and structured
questioning by the police, it is undeniably testimonial. The
reason, I believe, is that the witness must have understood (as
did the police) that the statement was transmitting
information for use in prosecution. This conclusion would
remain the same even if we found out that the witness only
gave the statement under pressure, because she thought doing
so would help her own status with the authorities; or that,
feeling personal sympathy with the defendant, she hoped even
while making the statement that it would never be used; or
that she made the statement primarily for the purpose of
personal catharsis, or expiation, or to secure her immediate
personal safety. In each case, this other purpose would have
been sufficient to explain her conduct even if use of the
statement in prosecution were not a possibility. In short,

29
See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005), (“If the
declarant is making a statement to the police with the intent that his or her statement
will be used against the defendant at trial, then the statement is testimonial.
Similarly, if the police officer elicits the statement in order to obtain evidence in
anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution, then the statement is testimonial.”),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705).
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understanding of the probable evidentiary use, rather than
desire for that use, is what makes the statement testimonial.
Second, as a practical matter, the inquiry into
anticipation is much easier than an inquiry into motivation.
Anticipation depends on, and can be proven by, external
circumstances; motivation demands a more searching
psychological inquiry.
Third, a test framed in terms of anticipation can be
applied on an objective basis. In Section V, immediately
following, I will assess the relative merits of a subjective test,
which looks to the actual state of mind of the actor, and an
objective test, which looks to the state of mind of an
hypothesized reasonable person in that actor’s position. Both
types of test have their merits, but I think it is clear that most
courts prefer an objective test. If the test is one of anticipation,
it can be applied objectively (What would a reasonable person
in that position have anticipated?) as well as subjectively
(What did this declarant anticipate?). But if the test is one of
motive, it would be hard to apply it coherently except
subjectively, on the basis of the witness’s actual motivations.
To answer the question of what would have motivated a
reasonable person who acted as the declarant did in the
declarant’s position would require positing not only the base of
knowledge of that hypothetical person but also a set of values;
that makes for an inquiry that is at best very complex.
V.

SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?

Again, I will assume for now that the perspective of the
witness is the crucial one. In Part IV, I have argued that
anticipation of use in prosecution is the crucial question. But
in answering this question, should we take a subjective or
objective view? That is, should we ask whether this particular
declarant anticipated use in prosecution, or should we ask
whether a reasonable person in the position of the declarant
would anticipate such use?
In most cases, I do not think the choice makes very
much difference. Assuming the test is a subjective one, a court
would still perforce often determine what the declarant’s
anticipation was by relying largely on surrounding
circumstances. In other words, the court would infer that the
declarant did (or did not) anticipate use in prosecution from its
perception that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would (or would not) anticipate such use.
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The subjective approach has the advantage of
theoretical simplicity; the objective approach, but not the
subjective approach, requires a court to determine both a set of
characteristics that it will assume a reasonable person has in
this context and a set of criteria defining what it means to be in
the declarant’s position. The subjective approach is also more
intellectually straightforward: It is easier to explain why a
statement should be deemed testimonial given that the person
who actually made the statement anticipated prosecutorial use
than to explain why the statement should be deemed
testimonial given that a mythical person who might be quite
different from the actual declarant would have anticipated
such use.
On the other hand, because it does not entail an inquiry
into the actual declarant’s state of mind, the objective approach
is more likely to yield some categorical rules, and to the extent
reasonable rules could be crafted, that would be a welcome
development. Not all situations lend themselves to categorical
rules, or at least not to simple categorical rules – 911 calls
reporting an assault while the assailant is still nearby provide
a good example. 30 But some situations do. For example, I
believe that a statement describing an assault made after the
assailant has left to a police officer responding at the scene
should, if an objective test is used, be deemed testimonial as a
categorical matter.
Even though it is theoretically more complex, therefore,
the objective approach is probably simpler in actual
implementation, and this factor appears to have made it more
attractive to courts. An objective approach is, as I have argued
in Part IV, more easily compatible with a definition of
testimonial that depends on the anticipation of a reasonable
declarant than with a definition that depends on such a
declarant’s motivation. Apart from this, the chief consequence
of the choice between an objective and subjective approach may
well be in the context of child witnesses. As I shall show in
Part XI, an objective approach would tend to characterize more
statements by children as testimonial than would a subjective
approach.

30

See infra Part X.
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I have argued in Part IV that anticipation of use in
prosecution is the key question in determining whether a
statement is testimonial.
But whose anticipation?
The
declarant’s? Governmental authorities’? 31 Both – so that a
statement is not deemed testimonial unless both the declarant
and governmental authorities anticipate use in prosecution?
Either – so that a statement is deemed testimonial if either the
declarant or governmental authorities anticipate use in
prosecution? I will contend here that it is the perspective of the
declarant – the witness – that matters. (For simplicity of
expression, I will speak here as if it is the actual anticipation of
the declarant that is material – that is, that a subjective test is
used – though the test could be objective or subjective, as
discussed in Part V.) In this Part, I will contend that the fact
that governmental authorities are gathering evidence for use in
prosecution does not make a statement testimonial if the
declarant does not understand that this is happening. In Part
VII, I will argue that if the declarant does anticipate that the
statement will be used in prosecution, that is sufficient, even if
the statement was not made to a governmental agent. In
short, government involvement in the production of the
statement is neither sufficient nor necessary to make the
statement testimonial.
This is a contentious area. I will approach it first by
showing that making the intentions or anticipation of
government agents the dispositive consideration, or a sufficient
factor to characterize the statement as testimonial, would lead
to some unappealing results – and unappealing in particular to
one arguing from a pro-prosecution perspective. A statement
by a co-conspirator of the defendant, made for the purpose of
furthering the conspiracy but to an undercover police agent,
was clearly admissible under pre-Crawford law. I suspect that
the Supreme Court would be loath to adopt any theory that
would entail a change in this result. 32 But if the intention of a
government agent to gather evidence for use in prosecution is

31
With respect to governmental authorities, it would not much matter
whether the test were phrased in terms of purpose or anticipation; it would rarely
occur that a government agent would take a statement with the anticipation, but
without the purpose, that the statement be used in prosecution.
32
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Crawford, 2003 WL 22705281
(No. 02-9410).
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the critical consideration, then such a statement is clearly
testimonial, for that is precisely what the agent is trying to do.
So what makes the statement non-testimonial? Clearly it is
that the declarant did not anticipate a prosecutorial use of the
statement.
Similarly, consider the cases in which police intercept
calls to a drug or gambling house, either by answering the
telephone and playing the role of an order-taker or by
monitoring an answering machine; the callers, unaware that
they are speaking to the police, place their orders or make
communications otherwise indicating their awareness of the
business performed at the house. The American cases were in
consensus before Crawford that these utterances are
admissible, 33 and that is the proper result. But any attempt to
contend that the police are not gathering evidence for use in
prosecution would be utterly unconvincing. Assuming such an
utterance is deemed to be a statement offered to prove the
truth of what it asserts, the reason the statement is not
testimonial is that the declarant did not anticipate
prosecutorial use. 34
These examples suggest that an intention on the part of
a government agent to gather evidence for prosecutorial
purposes does not in itself make a statement testimonial. And
as a theoretical matter I believe this conclusion is right.
Police and other government agents gather evidence for
prosecutorial purposes from many different sources. Think of
three categories. Category 1 includes sources of information
other than communications by humans – blood, maggots,
bloodhounds, DNA tests, skid marks, and so forth. The police
may, for prosecutorial purposes, observe a phenomenon of
evidentiary significance, and even generate one, but plainly
this type of evidence poses no Confrontation Clause problem.
By contrast, Category 2 includes statements made to
government investigators by declarants who know the
investigators are gathering evidence for prosecutorial purposes.
This type of evidence seems clearly to be testimonial within the
33
See, e.g., United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Zenni,
492 F. Supp. 464, 465, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980); People v. Nealy, 279 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38-39
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
34
Cf. People v. Morgan, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(treating utterances as hearsay within an exception and holding that admission did not
violate Confrontation Clause because – among other, spurious, grounds – of “their
unintentional nature”).
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meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Category 3 includes
statements made by humans who do not realize that their
audience is a government investigator gathering evidence for
use in prosecution; the classic example is that of a conspirator
making a statement to an undercover police officer. I contend
that for Confrontation Clause purposes evidence in Category 3
is more like evidence in Category 1, from non-human sources,
than like evidence in Category 2, the self-conscious testimonial
statement. The critical factor distinguishing Category 2 from
Category 1, and also from Category 3, is that only in Category
2 is the source cognizant of the likely prosecutorial use of the
statement.
A skeptic may contend that the critical factor
distinguishing Category 1 from Category 2 is that one cannot
usefully attempt to cross-examine a maggot or a bloodhound, to
say nothing of a vial of blood or a skid mark. If that were so,
Category 3 would materially resemble Category 2 more than
Category 1. And it may seem at first that this view is correct,
because of course if a statement is testimonial for
Confrontation Clause purposes it cannot be admitted against
the accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. Nevertheless, I believe this view is wrong. For
at least two reasons, the ability of the declarant to be crossexamined is not the hallmark of what makes a statement
testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.
First, there is more to confrontation than crossexamination; though cross-examination has taken on greater
importance over time, historically the core of the right, as its
name suggests, has been the right of the accused to demand
that prosecution witnesses testify in his presence. 35 And even
now that is an essential aspect of the right. 36
Yet no

35
See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“[T]here is at least some room
for doubt (and hence litigation) as to the extent to which the Clause includes those
elements [the right of cross-examination and restriction on admissibility of out-of-court
statements], whereas . . . simply as a matter of English it confers at least a right to
meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”) (internal citations
omitted). Although early Athenian witnesses testified orally at trial, the right to crossexamine appears not to have been invoked frequently. Todd, supra note 8, at 29. Note
also the declaration of the Roman governor Festus, Acts 25:16, supra note 12, which
insisted on the accuser being brought face-to-face with the accused but says nothing
about questioning the accuser. See also Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1024-25
n.74 (noting a period in trial of treason cases in which witnesses were brought before
the accused but he was not allowed to question them directly).
36
See Statement of Scalia, J., 535 U.S. 1159, 1160 (2002) (explaining reasons
for joining majority decision not to transmit to Congress proposed amendment to
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confrontation problem is posed by, say, the fact that the
accused was not present when the chemicals used in a DNA
test were generating their evidence – even though the test was
performed by government agents for the purpose of producing
evidence for prosecution and it would be possible to demand the
accused’s presence.
Second, that cross-examination was never possible does
not relieve a Confrontation Clause problem if a human
statement is testimonial. Corpses cannot be cross-examined
any more than bloodhounds or maggots can. Suppose that the
prosecution takes the deposition of a witness – clearly a
testimonial statement – and just before cross-examination is
about to start the witness dies of a heart attack, through
nobody’s fault.
If the prosecution offers the deposition
transcript at trial, and the accused objects on confrontation
grounds, the prosecution could not validly contend, “Crossexamination is not possible now and it never was possible. It is
therefore silly to exclude this evidence on the basis that the
accused has not had an opportunity for cross-examination and
that in some imaginable state of the world he might have had
such an opportunity.” The court would rule in effect, “Sorry.
This evidence doesn’t satisfy the conditions for proper
testimony. I understand that it was impossible to satisfy those
conditions. But that’s your tough luck.” Courts could say
something like that when the prosecution wants to prove the
reaction of a bloodhound: “Sorry. Cross-examination is not
possible. I know there is nothing you can do or could have done
to make it possible, but given that it is not possible, this
evidence just doesn’t satisfy the conditions for testimony.” But
of course courts do not do that; though in exposing the
bloodhound to a bloody shirt the police were trying to secure
evidence for use in prosecution, what the bloodhound did by
barking is evidence that was solicited by the police, but it is not
testifying within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(b) that would have allowed testimony from a
remote location, subject to cross-examination, in a limited set of circumstances):
As we made clear in [Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846-47 (1990)], a
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make
their accusations in the defendant’s presence – which is not equivalent to
making them in a room that contains a television set beaming electrons that
portray the defendant’s image. Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to
protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect
real ones.
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And why not? It appears that the essence of testifying
is provision of information understanding there is a significant
probability it will be used in prosecution. The bloodhound
lacks the understanding to make his bark testimonial – and so
does the conspirator or the unwitting drug customer. Without
such understanding on the part of the source of information –
whether that source is a human declarant or not – all we can
say is that a phenomenon occurred, one that was observed or
perhaps even generated by government agents. But that does
not make the evidence testimonial. If, by contrast, the source
of the information is a human who does understand its likely
use, we can say that she was playing a conscious, knowing role
in the criminal justice system, providing information with the
anticipation that it would be used in prosecution – and that
certainly sounds a lot like testifying. Furthermore, without
such understanding on the part of the declarant, the situation
lacks the moral component allowing the judicial system to say
in effect, “You have provided information with the knowledge
that it may help convict a person. If that is to happen, our
system imposes upon you the obligation of taking an oath,
saying what you have to say in the presence of the accused, and
answering questions put to you on his behalf.” 37
In sum, the fact that evidence is created through the
participation of a government agent does not make the
evidence testimonial. The conduct of the purported witness
must be testimonial in nature. A conspirator going about his
routine conspiratorial business is not performing a testimonial
act, nor is a drug or gambling customer placing an order. To be
testimonial, it must appear from the perspective of the witness
that the statement is transmitting information that will, to a
significant probability, be used in prosecution.
VII.

STATEMENTS NOT MADE TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENTS

Part VI has shown that government involvement is not
sufficient to make a statement testimonial. But is it necessary?
I believe the answer is negative. That a statement is made to a
government agent is often a factor supporting a conclusion that
37

See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003) (viewing the Confrontation Clause
as giving the accused not merely the right to confront the witnesses but primarily the
right to demand that the witnesses against him assume the burden of confronting
him).
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the statement is testimonial. But there is no requirement that
the statement be made to such an agent. If the declarant
anticipates that the statement, or the information asserted in
it, will be conveyed to the authorities and used in prosecution,
then it is testimonial, whether it is made directly to the
authorities or not.
Once again I will argue both from consequences and
from theory.
A rule providing that a statement is not
testimonial unless it is made directly to government agents
would have some consequences that I believe are intolerable. A
witness who did not want to undergo the rigors of crossexamination could presumably send a statement to the court,
in writing or other recorded form: “Here’s what I have to say.
Please read it at trial; I don’t want to come in person.” If that
statement were considered testimonial – on a theory that the
court is a government agent, and all that is necessary is that
such an agent receive the statement directly, not that the agent
play a role in procuring the statement – the reluctant witness
would still have an easy alternative. She could simply make a
statement to a friend and ask the friend, as her agent, to pass
the statement on to the authorities or directly to court; even if
the friend had to testify subject to cross-examination, that
would probably not be a hardship, because she would only be
testifying that the reluctant witness made the statement.
In many cases the witness would not even have to take
the initiative. I think it is not only plausible but virtually
inevitable that, if a government agent standard is established
by the courts, private victims’ rights organizations will provide
a comfortable way for many complainants to create evidence for
use in prosecution without having to confront the accused:
“Make a videotape, and then go on vacation. We’ll bring the
tape to court and present the testimony necessary to get the
tape shown to the jury. Don’t worry, you never have to look the
accused in the eye, you never have to answer questions by his
attorney, and you don’t even have to take an oath.” How can
the making of that videotape not be considered testimonial?
Similarly, if a dying murder victim says to a private
person nearby, “Jack shot me!” I do not believe the statement
is made for the edification or amusement of the listener; clearly
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it is made to help bring the assailant to justice, and that makes
it testimonial. 38
These examples suggest that government involvement
in the creation of a statement is not necessary to make the
statement testimonial. History lends further support to the
point. The confrontation right predates the existence of
government prosecutors or police. As I mentioned in Part II,
the Hebrews, the early Athenians, and the Romans all
protected the right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him. In England, state prosecutors did not become the
norm for ordinary crime until the nineteenth century, 39 but the
right to confront was established long before; indeed, in the
sixteenth century Thomas Smith described the criminal trial as
an “altercation” between accuser and accused. 40 If today a
jurisdiction were to eliminate state prosecutors, returning to a
system in which crime was privately prosecuted, I do not
believe we would say that this change virtually nullified the
confrontation right, allowing a private prosecutor or his agent
to gather statements from observers and report them all in
court.
Moreover, it makes no sense conceptually to say that a
statement must be made to a government agent for it to be
deemed testimonial. Granted, there is language in Crawford
emphasizing prosecutorial abuse. 41 But it must be remembered
that it is not prosecutorial authorities who violate the
Confrontation Clause. Certainly the authorities do not violate
the Clause when they take a statement behind closed doors
from a witness. We expect the police to take confidential
statements; often they would be derelict in their investigatory
duty if they did not do so. The violation of the Clause occurs
when a testimonial statement is admitted at trial against an
accused without his being afforded an opportunity to confront
the witness. The prosecutor may be said to be complicit in the
violation, because presumably it was the prosecutor who
sought admissibility. But it is the court that commits the
violation by deciding to admit the statement notwithstanding
38
The statement may nevertheless be admissible, preferably on the basis
that the accused forfeited the confrontation right, but that is another matter.
39
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 35-36 (1986).
40
THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1583) (describing a typical criminal trial).
41
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 n.7 (“Involvement of government
officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique
potential for prosecutorial abuse . . . .”).
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the lack of confrontation. 42 Once again, if we imagine a world
without prosecutors, this time a world in which the court
gathers evidence against the accused, that should not mean the
destruction of the confrontation right; Alice should not be
allowed to testify, “Barbara chose not to come here today, but
she asked me to relay to you her rendition of what she saw at
the crime scene.”
I am only arguing that there is no per se rule that a
statement cannot be testimonial unless it is made to a
government agent; the bottom line question is what the witness
anticipated. In some cases, as suggested by the examples I
have given above, the anticipation of prosecutorial use is clear
even though the statement is made to a private person. In
other cases, there will be no good basis for inferring such an
anticipation. And clearly, when the statement is made to a
prosecutorial agent, that will often be a strong basis for
drawing an inference that the declarant anticipated that the
statement would be used in prosecution. Sometimes, indeed,
the agent will announce this intention. But even if she does
not, in some contexts the likely use is obvious from the nature
of the statement and the open presence of a government officer.
“Our neighbor parked his car strangely yesterday” said to one’s
spouse, when nothing else unusual appears to have happened,
will probably be characterized as a “casual remark to an
acquaintance.” 43 But now suppose that what prompted the
statement was this question by a police officer: “We’re
investigating a murder in the neighborhood. Did you notice
anything strange yesterday?” Then the statement seems
plainly testimonial.
A rule refusing to deem a statement to be testimonial
unless it was made to a government agent might be mitigated
by stretching the meaning of “government agent.” Suppose a
calm, collected statement to a privately employed 911 operator
describing a crime that occurred several hours before. Perhaps

42
The court is a state actor, and so the decision to admit the statement
constitutes state action, a necessary element under the Fourteenth Amendment, which
makes the Confrontation Clause applicable to the states. See generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 486 (2d ed. 2002)
(summarizing the so-called “state action” doctrine: “The Constitution’s protections of
individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection apply only to the
government [though the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery should be
excepted from this broad statement]. Private conduct generally does not have to
comply with the Constitution.”).
43
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
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the 911 operator may be considered a government agent
because the company that employs her is under contract with
government agencies. Or consider an emergency room doctor,
who regularly receives and passes on to the authorities victims’
descriptions of crimes. Perhaps she, too, can be considered a
government agent, even if she is not a public employee, because
she is under a legal obligation to report the statement. But
such manipulations are not a satisfactory resolution of the
problem because they require generous use of the term
“government agent” and because they cannot reach all
situations in any event. It would be far better to acknowledge
frankly that in some circumstances a statement may be
testimonial even though it is not made directly to a government
agent.
VIII.

INTERROGATION 44

Since Crawford, some courts have said that a statement
is not testimonial unless it is made in response to
governmental interrogation. 45 And indeed, some have gone
further, refusing to characterize a statement as testimonial
unless it meets a restrictive definition of interrogation as
“structured police questioning.” 46 This idea has begun to
distort police practices, as police try to act in such a way that
prosecutors can later argue that statements made to the police
were not in response to interrogation. 47
I believe that the whole supposed interrogation
requirement is entirely mistaken. Interrogation – like the
participation of a government agent in the making of a
statement – is a factor that in some contexts supports an
inference that the statement is testimonial, but the statement
may be testimonial even though it is not in response to
interrogation.

44
I have adapted this Part from an entry called “The Interrogation Bugaboo”
that I posted on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan.
20, 2005, 1:12 EST).
45
E.g., United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *2-4
(D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004); People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004), appeal held in abeyance by 697 N.W.2d 527 (Mich.
2005).
46
E.g., State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211-12 (Me. 2004); People v. Newland,
775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), leave to appeal denied, 817 N.E.2d 835, 3
N.Y.3d 679, and 821 N.E.2d 981, 3 N.Y.3d 759 (2004).
47
See Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, supra note 24.
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Those who contend that interrogation is necessary for a
statement to be deemed testimonial have language they can
point to in Crawford, though it is quickly apparent that the
language does not really support them. Sylvia Crawford’s
statements were made in response to police interrogation, and
the Court held that, whatever else the category of testimonial
statements might include, statements made in response to
police interrogation certainly fall within it. Here are the
passages in question, with emphasis added in each case:
[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by
law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class. 48
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations
are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.
Police
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by
justices of the peace in England. 49
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed. 50

There is no indication, then, that statements not made
during formal testimonial events – a preliminary hearing,
grand jury or a former trial – must be in response to police
interrogation to be considered testimonial. The Court was very
clear that it was merely listing a core class of testimonial
statements, a class that plainly includes the statements at
issue in the Crawford case itself, and was deciding no more
than that these statements are testimonial. Left for another
day was the question of what additional statements, if any,
shall be considered testimonial. It is true that the Court left
open the possibility that it will not consider any statements
beyond this core class to be testimonial. Indeed, the fact that
the Court took the care, in footnote 4, to offer some elaboration
on the meaning of “interrogation” 51 confirms that the Court
preserved the possibility that the term would in some
48

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
51
There the Court said that it was using the term in a colloquial sense, that
it did not have to choose among definitions, and that “Sylvia’s recorded statement,
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any
conceivable definition.” Id. at 53 n.4.
49
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circumstances be decisive. But that is as far as the Court went
in this direction. It offered no intimation that a statement not
made in response to interrogation would not be considered
testimonial.
And it certainly did not suggest that if a
statement was not “knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning” it would not be testimonial; it merely said
that a statement meeting that standard “qualifies under any
conceivable definition.” 52
So Crawford does not tell us that a statement must be
in response to interrogation to be characterized as testimonial.
And common sense tells us that there is no such requirement.
Suppose that at trial a prosecutor or the court issues a general
invitation: “Anyone who knows anything about this incident,
please feel free to come to the front of the courtroom and tell us
what you know.” After Observer does so, the prosecutor says,
“Thank you. You may go.” Alertly, defense counsel objects
because of a lack of confrontation. “But,” says the prosecutor,
“this was no witness.
I did not subject her to any
interrogation.” The prosecutor is right that there was no
interrogation, but of course we would expect the legal
argument to be rejected sneeringly. What Observer was doing
was testifying. It does not matter that her statement was not
given in response to questions; nor would it matter whether it
was she or the prosecutor or the court who took the initiative in
arranging for her to give the testimony.
Now suppose the invitation comes not at trial but at the
police station: “Ms. Observer, if you care to make a statement,
please feel free to do so. I will videotape it, and when this
perpetrator stands trial I will give the prosecutor the tape so
that she can play it in front of the jury.” I think it is equally
obvious that a statement made in response to this invitation is
testimonial. And now suppose an observer walks into the
police station and says, “You don’t know about a crime that has
been committed, but I am now going to tell you, and I expect
that you will then want to prosecute. Please record what I am
about to say, because I expect you will want to use it at trial – I
do not like the idea of being under oath and having to answer
questions by some aggressive defense lawyer.” I cannot see a
plausible basis on which this statement should not be deemed
testimonial. Or suppose the observer walks into the police

52

Id.
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station with an affidavit completed, describing the crime. Does
anyone seriously contend that this is not testimonial?
Of course, the statements in these hypotheticals are
more formal than in the usual case, in which a witness makes a
statement to a police officer in the field, perhaps before the
officer is confident that a crime has been committed. But, for
reasons that I will analyze in Part IX, formality is not required
to render a statement testimonial. If the declarant in that field
situation understands full well that once the officer receives
the statement it is likely to be used for prosecutorial purposes,
then the statement is testimonial. The declarant is creating
evidence – and this critical reality is unaffected by the facts
that (1) until the moment the statement was made, the police
officer was not confident that a crime had been committed, and
(2) structured questioning by the officer was not necessary to
secure the statement.
The bottom line is that if the declarant is making the
statement in a situation warranting a reasonable anticipation
of prosecutorial use, it is testimonial, even if it is made without
questioning by government authorities or entirely on the
witness’s own initiative. Interrogation may, however, be a
significant factor in indicating that a reasonable person in the
position of the declarant would have this anticipation; if the
authorities are interrogating, that is a factor that would often
convey to the declarant the likelihood of prosecutorial use. But
when the declarant is reporting a crime, this factor is not
necessary to characterize the statement as testimonial; she
knows that she is conveying to the authorities information
about a crime, and presumably she understands that they will
use that information to invoke the machinery of criminal
justice. To hold that such a statement is not testimonial is
merely to try to avoid Crawford because it makes prosecutions
more difficult.
IX.

FORMALITY 53

Some cases have indicated that a statement cannot be
considered testimonial for purposes of the Crawford inquiry

53
I have adapted this Part from an entry called “The Formality Bugaboo”
that I posted on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan.
2, 2005, 12:55 EST).
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unless it was made formally. 54 Once again, I believe this view
represents a misunderstanding of Crawford, and of the basic
approach to the confrontation right that Crawford reflects.
Again, courts adopting this rule can find some language
in Crawford to cite in their support, though ultimately, once
again, the attempt is unavailing. First, drawing on a definition
given by Noah Webster, Justice Scalia wrote that testimony “is
typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” 55 Second,
Justice Scalia then offered this contrast: “An accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not.” 56 Third, one of the three
formulations of the class of testimonial statements presented
by Justice Scalia is the one adopted by Justice Thomas (with
Justice Scalia himself joining) in his separate opinion in White
v. Illinois: “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.” 57
Even on their face, none of these three passages adopts
a formality rule. The Court did not say that testimony must be
a solemn declaration; it said that testimony typically is such a
declaration. The two polar categories, “a formal statement to
government officers” and “a casual remark to an acquaintance,”
plainly do not exhaust all possibilities, and so presenting these
two does not indicate where the boundary between testimonial
and non-testimonial lies. As for the Thomas formulation, it is
only one of three alternatives presented by the Court, and the
only one that includes a formality rule. Moreover, it is not
clear whether Justice Thomas regards confessions as being a
subset of “formalized testimonial materials”; if so, it is not clear
why, because confessions can be very informal, and if not, it is
not clear why the two sets, “formalized testimonial materials”
and “confessions,” should be deemed to constitute the overall
class of testimonial statements.
54
E.g., People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 17, 2004), review denied, 2004 WL 1832719 (Nov. 17, 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 1713 (2005). See also Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336-37 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004)
(dictum).
55
541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
56
541 U.S. at 51.
57
Id. at 51-52 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).

268

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

In short, nothing in Crawford compels the conclusion
that only formal statements can be deemed to be testimonial.
And courts should not adopt such a rule, most importantly
because it makes no sense. Consider this exchange: 58
Police Officer: Please have a cup of coffee and make yourself
comfortable. If that chair is too hard, please let me know and I’ll get
you a cushion.
Witness: Thanks so much. The chair is fine, but I’d love some milk
if you have it.
Officer: Sure. Here you go. You know, I’m collecting evidence for
the trial of Suspect on robbery charges. I know you’ll find it
inconvenient and unpleasant to testify in court, so why don’t you tell
me everything you remember, and then I’ll tell the jury everything
you’ve told me. We can do this very informally. In fact, I’m not even
going to take notes. So just start talking whenever you’re ready.
Witness: OK. Well, I was just walking down Main Street, minding
my own business . . .

It seems to me clear that this statement is testimonial.
Clearly, Witness is making a statement with the anticipation
that it will be used in prosecution and (if it mattered, which of
course I do not think it should) Officer understands that as
well. But just as clearly, the statement seems informal – or,
alternatively, it cannot be considered formal without robbing
that term of all meaning. Finally, it seems obvious that this
type of statement should not be admitted against Suspect if he
never has an opportunity to cross-examine Witness. And –
here is the crucial part – it is inadmissible not despite the lack
of formality but, one may say, in large part because of it.
What formalities is this statement missing? Most
notable are the presence of the accused and the opportunity for
him to cross-examine. Those, of course, are the essence of the
confrontation right. Clearly, the logic could not be that because
of their absence the statement is informal and therefore the
confrontation right does not apply, because that is a Catch-22
that would prevent the right from ever applying. Apart from
those two, the most obvious formality is the oath. But we
already know from Crawford itself that the absence of the oath
will not make the statement non-testimonial; the majority

58
I could make the same point by using the actual situation addressed by the
decision of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 666-68 (6th Cir.
2004), which rejected a formality requirement. Id. at 673-74.
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opinion was quite explicit on this point, 59 and the statement at
issue in that case was not given under oath. There are other
formalities as well that usually accompany testimony – the
question-and-answer format and the general ceremonial nature
of the courtroom – but these are of lesser importance; I have
already explained in Part VIII why I do not believe
interrogation is necessary to make a statement testimonial.
In short, the absence of formalities does not render a
statement non-testimonial; rather, the absence of the most
important formalities may make unacceptable as evidence a
statement that is testimonial in nature. This casts a helpful
light on dictionary definitions, like the one quoted by Crawford,
that include formality as a component of testimony: Formality
is an ideal, an aspect of testimony given in the optimal way, at
trial in open court. The purpose of the Confrontation Clause,
indeed, is to ensure that testimony be given in an acceptably
formal way, in the presence of the accused and subject to crossexamination, and if reasonably possible at an open trial. To
say that the absence of formality takes a statement that would
otherwise be deemed testimonial outside the purview of the
Clause would be to treat a defect of the statement as a virtue.
It would also give investigating officers precisely the wrong
incentive. They would tend to avoid whatever procedure is
deemed to be a critical aspect of formality, so that statements
given to them in full anticipation of evidentiary use would then
be deemed non-testimonial and outside the rule of Crawford.
Once again, simply because this factor, formality, is not
required to make a statement testimonial does not mean that it
is irrelevant in determining whether the statement is
testimonial – that is, roughly speaking, that it was made in
anticipation of prosecutorial use. For example, in Crawford the
statement was videotaped, with an introduction by the
investigating officer that left no doubt about why the statement
was being taped. But when a witness to a completed crime
knowingly makes a statement to the police or other authorities
describing the crime, the statement should be deemed
testimonial, no matter how informally it was taken, because
the likely evidentiary use is so clear.
The presence of
formalities can reinforce that determination, but they are not
necessary to it.
59
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53 n.3 (“We find it implausible that a
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by
unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”) (emphasis in original).
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EXCITED TESTIMONY

Before Crawford, the decision in White v. Illinois, 60
treating the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as
a “firmly rooted” one for purposes of applying the reliability
test of Roberts and holding that the unavailability requirement
of Roberts did not apply to them, 61 gave a green light to
prosecutors and courts to try cases by introducing statements
made in 911 calls and to responding officers, even if the
declarant did not testify. This is a practice that Bridget
McCormack and I have called “dial-in testimony.” 62
Allowing this kind of evidence made it possible to try
domestic violence cases by using the complainant’s description
of the incident, even without the complainant having testified
in front of the accused. Many courts and prosecutors engaged
in domestic violence cases give this practice a euphemistic
name – “evidence-based prosecutions” – that is extraordinarily
ironic, like the names of the Ministries of Love, Peace, and
Truth in 1984: These prosecutions are most notable for the
critical evidence that they lack, testimony given by the
complainant subject to cross-examination. Since Crawford,
many courts have continued operating essentially as they did
before. Indeed, I believe that some courts and prosecutors who
are actively engaged in domestic violence cases, determined to
maintain the practice, have adopted a “draw the wagons”
approach. 63
I believe a sensible view recognizes that just because a
declarant is excited does not mean that the statement was not
60

502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Id. at 356-58.
62
See generally Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, passim.
63
For example, consider what happened when the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges published in its journal Juvenile Justice Today an
article by two Florida judges saying that courts could essentially ignore Crawford by
invoking the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. Amy Karan &
David M. Gersten, Domestic Violence Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake of Crawford v.
Washington, 13 JUVENILE & FAMILY JUSTICE TODAY, No. 2, at 20 (Summer 2004).
Bridget McCormack, Jeff Fisher, and I, believing this article reflected a misleading
ruling of Crawford that would eventually lead to many reversed convictions, wrote a
response. The Council has refused to publish this article; it has said that its tone
would be insulting to the judges who are valued members of the organization. We have
expressed mystification about this contention, and have offered to adjust the tone to
whatever extent necessary, but the Council has declined to change its decision. It is
hard for me to perceive this decision as anything but censorship of views the Council
finds unacceptable. A link to our essay is posted on The Confrontation Blog under the
title A Case of Censorship?, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Feb. 15, 2005,
17:15 EST).
61
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testimonial in nature.
Crawford supports this view. In
footnote 8, the Court said that “to the extent the hearsay
exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all [at the
time the Sixth Amendment was adopted], it required that the
statements be made ‘immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and
before [the declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing
for her own advantage.’” 64 In other words, it may be that there
was no exception at all for spontaneous declarations; it may be
that statements made contemporaneously with the events at
issue were admitted only on non-hearsay grounds, as part of
the events being litigated – as part of the res gestae, in the
phrase usually now considered discredited. Certainly, nothing
like the latter-day exception for excited utterances existed –
and the reason presumably was recognition that narrative
statements by victims of completed crimes almost certainly are
made with anticipation of prosecutorial use, even though they
may be made for other purposes as well.
I believe 911 calls provide some very close decisions;
statements to responding officers are almost universally
testimonial. I will adhere to the summary that Bridget
McCormack and I have previously provided:
The more the statement narrates events, rather than merely asking
for help, the more likely it is to be considered testimonial.
Thus, if any significant time has passed since the events it describes,
the statement is probably testimonial. When, as is often the case,
the 911 call consists largely of a series of questions by the operator,
and responses by the caller, concerning not only the current incident
but the history of the relationship, the caller’s statements should be
considered testimonial. When O.J. Simpson called 911 to report an
assault by his girlfriend, his call was testimonial, not a plea for
urgent protection.
Often, of course, a 911 call is such a plea. Even in this type of
situation, a court should closely scrutinize the call. To the extent the
call itself is part of the incident being tried, the fact of the call
presumably should be admitted so the prosecution can present a
coherent story about the incident. But even in that situation, the
need to present a coherent story does not necessarily justify
admitting the contents of the call. And even if the circumstances do
warrant allowing the prosecution to prove the contents of the call,
those contents generally should not be admitted to prove the truth of
what they assert. If the contents of the call are probative on some
ground other than to prove the truth of the caller’s report of what

64

1694)).

541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.
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has happened, then admissibility should be limited to such other
ground. To the extent that the contents of the call are significant
only as the caller’s report of what has happened, such a report
usually should be considered testimonial. 65

XI.

CHILDREN

Children presented some of the most difficult issues
under the Roberts regime, and they will continue to do so under
Crawford. In a pre-Crawford article, I have discussed at some
length how a testimonial approach might apply to children’s
statements in various contexts. 66 Here I will offer only some
brief comments; I freely admit that my thought in this area
remains unsettled.
I tend to believe that some very young children should
be considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation
Clause purposes. Their understanding is so undeveloped that
their words ought to be considered more like the bark of a
bloodhound than like the testimony of an adult witness. And
perhaps, in accordance with Sherman Clark’s theory, we
should consider that morally they are so undeveloped that we
do not want to impose on them the responsibility of being
witnesses. 67
Even assuming a child is considered capable of being a
witness, there remains the question of whether a particular
statement should be considered testimonial.
Here, the
question of whether to take an objective or subjective view in
determining whether a statement is testimonial becomes
important. If the matter is viewed objectively, it probably does
not make much sense to apply a “reasonable child” standard,
and some courts that have confronted the issue have declined
to do so. 68 That is, an objective standard puts aside the
65

Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and
Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Winter 2002).
67
See Clark, supra note 36, at 1280-85.
68
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that, though Crawford’s reference to an “objective witness” could mean “an objective
witness in the same category of persons as the actual witness – here, an objective four
year old,” the more likely meaning is “that if the statement was given under
circumstances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an
objective observer, then the statement is testimonial.”); State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 38
(Haw. Ct. App. 2005); but see State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App.
2005), review granted (Minn. Mar. 29, 2005) (holding that to invoke Crawford the
defendant must show that “the circumstances surrounding the contested statements
led the [child victim] to reasonably believe her disclosures would be available for use at
a later trial, or that the circumstances would lead a reasonable child of her age to have
66
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particular incapacities of the given declarant, and it is not clear
why youth and immaturity should be treated differently from
other incapacities. On the other hand, there is something a
little odd about asking, with respect to a statement by a young
child, what the anticipation of a reasonable adult would be. If
a subjective test is used, I do not believe the proper question for
children should be whether the child anticipated prosecutorial
use in the sense of the formal procedures of the criminal justice
system. It should be enough if the child understood that she
was reporting wrongdoing and that some adverse consequences
– including that Mommy would get mad – would be visited on
the wrongdoer.
Another wrinkle is worth considering if a subjective test
is used, embellishing it with an estoppel rule: An investigator
should not be able to withhold information about the likely use
of the statement gratuitously for the purpose of being able to
contend that the statement was made without testimonial
understanding. 69 That rule seems to me to be correct as a
matter of principle; whether it would be sensibly applied is
another matter.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The question of whether a statement should be deemed
to be testimonial will provide many interesting and perplexing
issues over the next several years (fodder for Evidence exams!)
and it will continue to provide at least many close factual
issues long after that. But the existence of all these open
questions, and the possibility of treating them in a wide range
of ways, should not lead us to believe that Crawford is
anywhere near as manipulable as Roberts was, or that it did
not represent a great and beneficial development. Roberts did
not articulate a doctrine worthy of respect, and so

that expectation.”); In re D.L., No. 84643, 2005 WL 1119809, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May
12, 2005).
69
Suppose an investigator has no reasonable fear that revealing to the child
that she is looking into wrongdoing would inhibit the child from speaking, and yet she
declines to make the revelation so that the state can contend that the child did not
anticipate punitive use of her statement. In that case, the estoppel rule would apply.
On the other hand, an undercover police officer could decline to reveal her role to a
conspirator without invoking the estoppel rule, because given such a revelation the
conspirator presumably would not make statements useful to the officer.

274

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

manipulation was inevitable. 70 Crawford comes at least close
to articulating the fundamental principle underlying the
Confrontation Clause, a principle at the heart of our criminal
justice system – that if a witness testifies against an accused,
she must do so face to face, subject to oath and crossexamination. Crawford instantly made easy some cases – like
that of Michael Crawford himself – that had divided the lower
courts. If the Supreme Court continues to hold the line, lower
courts will have to listen. They will realize that there is a wide
range of conceivable ways in which witnesses can testify –
some formal, others not; some to government officers, others
not; some in response to questioning, others not; some after
calm reflection, others not. The Confrontation Clause has a
simple but strong demand: Prosecution testimony must be
given face to face with the accused, subject to crossexamination.

70
Acknowledging “interim uncertainty” created by its adoption of a new
standard, the Crawford Court noted that “the Roberts test is inherently, and therefore
permanently, unpredictable.” 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.

